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BANISHING THE BOGEY OF INCOMMENSURABILITY
LARRY ALEXANDERt
I have two major worries whenever I am asked to comment on
others' articles. The first is that I will know nothing about the sub-
ject, which, given the large number of subjects I know nothing about,
is highly likely. The second is that I will agree down the line with the
articles on which I am to comment, the probability of which increases
with the eminence of the authors, and which becomes almost a cer-
tainty if my first worry is borne out.
That is my predicament here. I really have not been a close fol-
lower of the literature on incommensurability, having just gotten
snatches of it from reading Joseph Raz,' Elizabeth Anderson,2 and
others. Ruth Chang4 and Lewis Kornhauser5 are also very able theo-
rists, both of whom I find quite convincing.
Yet, because Chang and Kornhauser are so good, they actually
have saved me from the ignominious fate of having nothing to say.
They have caused me to reflect upon certain aspects of the incom-
mensurability debate and to reach some conclusions, though quite
tentative ones. What I am interested in are various moral phenomena
that might be taken as demonstrating value incommensurability but
that I believe do nothing of the sort.
t Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I wish to thank
the participants in the Symposium on Law and Incommensurability for their excellent
comments.
' SeeJOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1986).
2 See ELiZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55-64 (1993).
3 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779, 795-812 (1994).
4 Ruth Chang, Comparison and the Justification of Choic4 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569
(1998).
- Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (1998). My com-
ments are somewhat orthogonal to Kornhauser's concerns, which is why I do not
comment directly on his fine article. I do, however, agree with his taxonomy of both
the private and social-choice aspects of the incommensurability debate and with the
implications of those aspects that he describes.
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I. WHAT INCOMMENSURABILITY IS NOT: A LAUNDRY LIST
I agree completely with Ruth Chang that to say a choice is justi-
fied is to imply the comparability of the thing chosen with those not
chosen.6 The worry about incommensurability, then, is that if two
courses of action are of incommensurable value, the choice between
them cannot be justified. That is surely a problem in the domain of
prudence. And it is a huge problem in the domain of moral values,
for it raises the specter of moral relativism.
Is there reason to believe that either moral or prudential values
are incommensurable, so that many moral or prudential choices can-
not be justified? I cannot demonstrate the complete absence of value
incommensurability. What I shall attempt to do, however, is point out
a number of things that might be taken to reveal value incommensur-
ability but do not, at least not in the way that would undermine justi-
fied choice.
A. Hard Choices
Frequently we are confronted with really difficult choices. Should
we pursue a career in law, for which we are moderately talented, and
which will allow us to have a conventional family life and considerable
comfort? Or should we instead pursue an artistic life, for which we
have great talent and love, but which will deprive us of the joys of
family and wealth? Should we move our family to a remote wilder-
ness, where we will be free from the pollution, crime, and moral cor-
ruption of city life, and where we can share the togetherness brought
about by isolation and home schooling? Or should we remain in the
city, where our children will have friends their own age and a chance
to encounter diverse peoples and values and become cosmopolitan in
outlook?
These dilemmas are paradigmatic of many hard choices we or
others might face. Do they suggest incommensurable values and thus
the incomparability of the chosen paths? I think not.
For one thing, as a matter of phenomenology, the choices seem
to be ones that might be unjustified. That is why we anguish over
them. If the values truly were incommensurable and the choices in-
6 See Chang, supra note 4, at 1572.
I shall use "incommensurable" throughout as a synonym for "incomparable," al-
though I realize that the terms have different meanings. I believe that the incompa-
rability of values is what usually is being claimed in the incommensurability literature.
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comparable, then why the anguish? If isolation is neither better nor
worse than city life, then whichever is chosen is as unjustified as its
competitor. One might as well blithely flip a coin. After all, when
choices are of equal value-as in picking a number on which to place
a bet in roulette-anguish is uncalled for. Anguish seems uncalled
for as well in cases in which incommensurability holds.
There is a second reason why these hard choices suggest com-
mensurable rather than incommensurable values. Suppose that in
the choice, say, between being a lawyer and being an artist, we alter
some of the outcomes. Suppose, for example, that if we become a
lawyer, we will be very successful, perhaps with a good chance of be-
ing appointed to the Supreme Court. And suppose that if we become
an artist, our work will be mediocre at best. The choice to become a
lawyer begins to look somewhat better than the choice to become an
artist. But if this is so, it suggests that these choices are comparable-
perhaps the metric of comparability is something like a "deeply satis-
fying life"-and that what looked like incommensurability was really
just epistemic uncertainty within a range.8 Once lawyering moves
above that range, or being an artist moves below it, we are more con-
fident in the justifiability of the choice of lawyering.
B. Personal Death
Some values appear incommensurable, I suspect, because the
choice of one rather than another would change us in ways that we
would view as extinguishing our current selves. At this stage in my
life, for example, I cannot envision deserting my family and career in
law teaching and running off to Tahiti to paint, even if, quite counter-
factually, I possessed the artistic talent of Gauguin. I can imagine an-
other person with (some of) my characteristics doing so, but that
someone would not be I.
Does this mean that the values at stake are incommensurable? I
do not think so. What it means is that the values are commensurable
only for those persons for whom they are accessible. A life like
Gauguin's is not accessible to me in any sense that would preserve my
personal identity. Although we can change our values over time and
maintain continuity of personal identity, we cannot do so radically.
8 Actually, the uncertainty can be either over the structure of the metric by which
the life plans are to be compared-how, for example, development of talent properly
is traded off against having a family-or over the facts.
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C. Deontological Side-Constraints and Lexical Priorities
Deontological side-constraints look, from a certain angle, like a
case of value incommensurability. After all, if one cannot knowingly
take an innocent life to save the lives of thousands of others, or if one
cannot lie to a murderer about the whereabouts of his intended vic-
tim, then neither lives nor lies can be traded for lives.
This form of value incommensurability, if that is what one wishes
to label it, however, is far different from the form that raises problems
of justified choice. For deontological side-constraints specify the
choice that is justified. They rank particular values-not deliberately
taking innocent lives, not lying-as lexically superior to others. On
some theories, such as rigorist Kantianism, the lexical superiority is
absolute. On others, such as those that contain "moral catastrophe"
exceptions, the lexical superiority operates only up to a point.
Theories that postulate a lexical ranking of values, whether within
morality, between morality and prudence (with moral values given
lexical superiority to prudential ones), or within the domain of pru-
dence, obviously do not give rise to problems ofjustified choice. For
if the theories themselves are justified, then they in turn specify the
ranking of the values, which means that the values are commensura-
ble in terms of the theory-specified metric. Deontological theories
may not be able to rank outcomes, but that is because they do rank
acts.
D. Counting the Numbers
In 1977, John Taurek published a highly provocative article enti-
tled, Should the Numbers Count? In it, he argued forcefully, if some-
what counterintuitively, that it was not necessarily true that the loss of
several lives is a worse outcome than the loss of fewer but different
lives. The argument was not that the fewer lives might be more pro-
ductive or more virtuous ones, or that their loss might upset more
survivors or otherwise more adversely affect the world. The argu-
ment, rather, was that even if all the lives were the same along all
these dimensions, the loss of more lives could not be regarded as
worse than the loss of fewer.
The reason, Taurek argued, is that losses are losses to particular
people, and that a loss to a particular person is never offset by a gain
(or prevention of a loss) to another particular person. A loss to one is
9 John Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977).
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never offset by a gain to another, because there is no particular per-
son for whom these losses and gains can be offset. Taurek's argu-
ment was a wrinkle on Robert Nozick's earlier, more general criticism
of utilitarianism, namely that utilitarianism improperly conflates the
rationality of weighing benefits and burdens across lives with the ra-
tionality of weighing benefits and burdens within a life.'1
Robert Nozick's individualism might entail the incomparability of
all gains and losses across individuals. Taurek's argument is not as
far-reaching as Nozick's, for Taurek does not deny that a lesser loss to
A is to be preferred to a greater loss to B. Taurek only denies that the
same loss qualitatively is affected by its distribution quantitatively.
Taurek's argument has been resisted by most philosophers, who
continue to argue that the loss of more lives is worse than the loss of
fewer different ones." Even if Taurek is correct, however, and his
critics are wrong, I would think that his argument establishes the
equality of similar losses rather than their incommensurability. A loss
of A's life is both morally equal to a loss of B's life and morally equal
as well to a loss of both B's and C's lives. The choice between the loss
of A's life and the loss of B's and C's lives will have to be governed by
some value other than the sanctity of life.
E. Rules and Commitments
Suppose I decide to do X or commit to doing X or adopt a rule
prescribing that I do X because at the time I do so, X appears to be
the most justified course of action. When the time comes to perform
X Ylooks preferable to X Would the choice of X be rationally justi-
fied?
The rationality of adopting rules and making decisions and com-
mitments is based on the paradoxical notion that the most rational
course of action to follow-the one that maximizes value-is not the
same as making each choice the most value-maximizing one. Without
rules, commitments, and decisions, our lives would be impover-
ished-indeed, unlivable. At any point in time, however, rules, com-
mitments, and decisions stand in the way of our lives being better.
There is extensive literature on this point that includes such diverse
10 SeeROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974).
" One of the best treatments of the "numbers" issue that takes a position opposed
to Taurek's can be found in 1 F.M. KAMM, MoRALrIY, MORTALITY 75-98 (1993).
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items as rational precommitments to behave irrationally and the need
for serious rules both in law and in personal 
matters. 2
The choice between sticking with our rules, commitments, and
decisions and optimizing at any given point in time looks arguably
like an example of incommensurability. And perhaps it is, though it
is not the kind of example to which those who assert value incom-
mensurability point. Indeed, they never mention it. I think it is not
at all what they have in mind and is viewed best not as value incom-
mensurability, but as a practical paradox in optimizing among quite
commensurable values.
F. Problems of Social Choice
Many of the phenomena I claimed have been mistaken for value
incommensurability cause problems in constructing a social-choice
function. Constructing such a function, of course, is bedeviled by
Arrow's theorem if we are restricted to ordinal rankings 
of policies. ' 3
We might overcome that difficulty if we could commensurate and ag-
gregate individuals' policy preferences. But suppose one person val-
ues A as lexically superior to B-for her, no amount of B could ever
make up for the loss of A-while another person values B as lexically
superior to A. How can A's and B's values be aggregated in a social-
choice function? Or suppose Taurek is correct, and a loss (or gain)
of value A for five people is not worse than or better than a loss (or
gain) of value A for one person. Again, how can a social-choice func-
tion handle that moral fact?
The problem here is not incommensurability as the term nor-
mally is understood. The problem, rather, is the separateness of indi-
viduals and what that entails for the multitude of unavoidable choices
that affect more than one person.
II. THE MOTIVATIONS FOR ASSERTING INCOMMENSURABILITY
I have argued that most cases of what might be thought to be
value incommensurability turn out to be something else. Why, then,
are theorists so quick to jump to value incommensurability to explain
12 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1994) (emphasizing the need for serious rules); see also
THOMAs C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 37-39 (1980) (discussing com-
mitments to irrational actions as rational conflict-resolution strategies).
Is See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-8 (2d ed.
1963).
1998] BANISHING THE BOGEY OFINCOMMENSURABILITY
these phenomena? Put differently, what is it about commensurability
that worries theorists?
A. Commodification and the Imperialism of the Market
If I were to pick one candidate as the one most likely to lie behind
the rush to embrace incommensurability, it would have to be the fear
of universal commodification, assigning a market price to everything
and thus making everything comparable in terms of money.14 If we
barter our kidneys for food, our babies for medical procedures, our
environment for creature comforts-and hence everything for
money, the efficient medium of exchange-then, according to many
social critics, we have become morally degraded. We have failed to
see that the values at stake cannot be assigned a price and thereby
made commensurable with other values. They are values beyond
price because-so the argument goes-they are incommensurable
values.
Now, I think this is a misdiagnosis, plain and simple. The fact
is-and I commend to you a recent book review by Linda Radzik and
David Schmidtz on this point'5-we do commensurate these values.
That is how we are able to trade them in the market.
The problem is that we often commensurate these values incor-
rectly. Perhaps the surrogate mother should not trade the use of her
reproductive capacities for money or the things money will buy her.
Or perhaps she should not trade them for a new car, though she
might be right to do so for an operation for one of her own children.
If there is no price at which she should sell-even to save one of her
children's lives-then the value of not renting one's womb always
trumps other values. If there is a price, then the value of not renting
one's womb trumps some values and is trumped by others. In either
case, the values at stake are commensurable, though like all values, of
course, they can be misappraised1
6
" See, e.g., MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 2-3 (1996) (stating
that her book will take issue with economic theorists who "reflect a methodological
archetype that I will call universal commodification" and noting that
"[c]ommensurability is central to commodification").
"' See Linda Radzik and David Schmidtz, Contested Commodities, 16 LAW & PHIL. 603
(1997) (reviewing RADIN, supra note 14).
,' Of course, believing that certain values are beyond all price, even when they are
not, may lead people to trade off those values at closer to the appropriate price than
they would without such a false belief. Alternatively, our erroneous belief in the in-
commensurability of values may lead people to give up too quickly in attempting to
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Thus, although we would act wrongly if we preferred one child
over another, or if we deliberately maimed our children, it is less clear
that Sophie in William Styron's Sophie's Choice
7 acted wrongly in
choosing to save her son rather than her daughter, or that the des-
perately poor of India act wrongly in having their children maimed to
increase their begging income. Some things are beyond price in
some circumstances-that is, when no superior values are threat-
ened-but not in others.'8
B. Endogeneity of Preferences
Cass Sunstein frequently has pointed out that many of our prefer-
ences are endogeneous to the particular set of laws, cultural norms,
and distribution of wealth we currently have.'
9 If those were to
change, so too would many of our preferences. Therefore, one can-
not justify the present regime by reference to our preferences, be-
cause those preferences are endogeneous to the regime.
This argument suggests that preference-based justifications are
incommensurable because preferences for social change are relative
to both starting and ending points. I take this point, however, as
closely related to the point I made about changes of values and per-
sonal continuity. The fact that we might value a change, were it to
occur, that we do not value from the standpoint of who we are here
and now is not an argument that can carry much force with us. The
fact that our values are wrong is one thing. The fact that "we" would
not hold these values under other circumstances is quite another.
Our present values and the values "we" would endorse under changed
figure out how values should be compared. See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Com-
mensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215 (1998).
Just as the belief in the incommensurability of values may in some circumstances
result in better commensuration, so too may the rhetoric of incommensurability serve
socially useful ends, even if values are in fact commensurable. See Eric A. Posner, The
Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1185, 1200-02 (1998).
17 WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE 483-84 (1979).
8 Value incommensurability often is cited as a reason for government agencies
not to employ cost-benefit analysis. I agree with Matthew Adler and Richard Craswell,
however, when they raise substantial doubts about whether value incommensurability
does, in fact, undermine cost-benefit analysis. See Matthew Adler, Incommensurability
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1417-18 (1998); Richard Craswell,
Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1429-32
(1998).
9 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).
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conditions may very well be incommensurable for us, but only be-
cause we cannot imagine "ourselves" holding the latter values.
C. Community Death
There is an analogue at the community level to personal death on
the individual level. A value might appear incommensurable with
values our community presently endorses because we cannot see
community identity being preserved if the former value becomes ac-
cepted. For example, if human gladiatorial contests of the sort vividly
described by Irving Kristol were permitted in the United States,
many would believe the basic identity of the community would have
radically changed; we would not be the same community we were. In
that sense, values are incommensurable for particular communities in
the same way they are for particular persons: Some values are un-
available because they cannot be adopted without a change in iden-
tity.
D. Totalitarianism
Isaiah Berlin might be the progenitor of the incommensurability
discussion. He asserted the plurality and irreducibility 
of values. 21
Liberty and equality were different values. One could not be reduced
to the other, nor could both be reduced to some other value.
Berlin was worried about totalitarianism, particularly the totalitar-
ian tendencies of arguments that would cast liberty in terms of equal-
ity. That was, and is, a real worry. Nevertheless, if Berlin is correct,
then a choice of liberty over equality-or the converse-cannot be
justified. Because for a choice to be justifiable, the options must be
comparable, which means commensurable along some dimension.
The irreducibility of plural values ultimately may be a greater source
of worry than their reducibility, for the former deprives us of a criti-
cism of zealotry.
There are a lot of things that are not, but may be mistaken for,
value incommensurability. And there are a lot of worries that, even if
well-founded, should not lead us to assert, or to wish for, value incom-
mensurability. The belief that values are incommensurable allows us
to give up too easily onjustifying our choices.
21 See Irving Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
21 IsAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 167-72 (1969).
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